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Individual and Country-level Institutional 
Trust and Public Attitude to Welfare 
Expenditures in 24 Transitional Countries
Nazim Habibov
Does institutional trust on the individual and on the country-
level influence public attitudes to state social welfare expendi-
tures in transitional countries of Central and Eastern Europe, 
the Caucasus and Central Asia? To answer this question, this 
study draws on a comparative survey conducted in 24 coun-
tries. Multilevel binomial logit regression was used to allow for 
the simultaneous inclusion of variables at the individual- and 
country-levels of analysis. Institutional trust is associated with 
positive attitudes to welfare expenditures on the individual level, 
but not on the country level. Women, older individuals, those 
who are less educated, and those of low-income are associated 
with more positive attitudes to social welfare investments. Ideol-
ogy is another important factor influencing public attitudes to 
welfare expenditures. By contrast, no significant effect of country-
level poverty, inequality, and gross domestic product was found. 
Key words: public redistribution, social capital, poverty, inequal-
ity, public opinion 
There has been a recent surge in interest the study of the 
beneficial effects of institutional trust on attitudes towards 
welfare state expenditures. This promising line of inquiry is 
guided by institutional theory (Edlund, 2006; March & Olsen, 
1984; Rothstein & Steinmo, 2002). According to institutional 
theory, trust in institutions reflects the degree of trust in the 
political system (Baron-Epel, Weinstein, Haviv-Mesika, Garty-
Sandalon, & Green, 2008). Institutional trust represents the 
level of confidence in members of the society that the system 
of institutions which exists in the society is able to deliver fa-
vorable outcomes, even in the absence of continuous scrutiny 
by individuals (Miller & Listhaug, 1990).
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Sociologically, the concept of trust in institutions is closely 
related to Putnam’s notion of ‘cooperation norms’ which serve 
as a specific form of trust, and are related to the general func-
tions of society (Voicu & Voicu, 2011). This concept stresses atti-
tude of the individual to formal institutions within the society 
and highlights the quality of interaction between individuals 
and institutions (Rainer & Siedler, 2009). The concept of trust 
in institutions is also associated with Coleman’s (1988) under-
standing of social capital as an interplay of norms of behaviors 
of individuals in the society and their obligation to each other 
and to the society at large. 
As such, institutional trust indicates a vertical dimension 
of social capital in society and it creates connections to its 
formal institutions (Lindström & Mohseni, 2009). It also repre-
sents a dimension of bridging social capital, which reflects per-
ceived levels of social justice, solidarity, and mutual support 
in society.
The positive effect of trust is well described in the literature. 
Thus, individuals in countries with higher levels of trust in-
teract more effectively with their society’s formal institutions, 
have more power and control over their lives, and consequent-
ly have a better welfare status (Blakely, Kennedy, & Kawachi, 
2001; Szreter & Woolcock, 2004). Similarly, higher levels of 
trust are associated with greater levels of political participa-
tion and enhanced opportunities for creating more generous 
policy and administration for individuals and communities in 
need (Lindström & Mohseni, 2009). Consequently, Levi (1997) 
concluded that “the more trustworthy citizens perceive gov-
ernment to be, the more likely they are to contingently consent 
to its policies” (p. 21). 
In addition to theoretical contributions, there is now em-
pirical evidence suggesting that institutional trust could be 
a significant determinant of public attitudes toward welfare 
expenditures. Trust in institutions played a critical role in the 
development of the welfare state in Germany and Sweden 
(Edlund, 2006; Gabriel & Trüdinger, 2011), and was also instru-
mental in defining attitudes towards welfare expenditures in 
the U.S. (Rudolph, 2009). Trust is also an important factor in 
explaining differences in public attitudes to welfare spending 
between Europe and the U.S. (Edlund, 1999). Finally, drawing 
on the data from 18 OECD countries, Rothstein, Samanni, & 
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Teorell (2009) found that trustworthy institutions are a vital 
prerequisite for peoples’ willingness to support expenditure 
for social welfare. 
Important as they are, the above-mentioned studies have 
three main limitations. First, most of the previously-mentioned 
studies were conducted at the individual level. Hence, only in-
dividual-level indicators of institutional trust were considered, 
and no attempt was made to include contextual indicators. 
This approach assumes that the beneficial properties of insti-
tutional trust are associated with individuals and their social 
relationships, instead of being a collective attribute of commu-
nities or societies. However, the traditional concept of social 
capital is a societal construct rather than a specific characteris-
tic of an individual. Social capital, including institutional trust, 
is a feature of the social organization of a society whereby civic 
participation, reciprocity, or trust in others assists in facilitat-
ing individual cooperation for mutual benefit (Putnam, 1993, 
2000). Hence, social capital would function as a resource for a 
group of individuals if they work together towards a collec-
tive goal which could not be achieved by each individual sepa-
rately (Macinko & Starfield, 2001). As a resource for a group 
of people, social capital could belong both to the smaller and 
most basic level of a group, for instance, the family, and, at 
the same time, to the larger and broader group, such as the 
country (Fukuyama, 1995). The studies of individual levels of 
institutional trust do not explicitly take account of the possibil-
ity of institutional trust being a collective attribute of society, 
and thus may obscure its possible contextual effect. 
To overcome the above-discussed limitation, this study 
explores institutional trust on both the individual and the 
country aggregated (contextual) levels at the same time. It 
makes the assumption that institutional trust at the individual 
and country-level may not necessary be in conflict. Rather, in-
stitutional trust at the individual and contextual levels could si-
multaneously contribute to defining attitudes towards welfare 
state expenditures. Since the effect of institutional trust at the 
contextual level may be confounded with its effect at the indi-
vidual level, this study employs multilevel regression model-
ing, which allows for the simultaneous examination of the two 
levels of effects. 
Secondly, most of the previously-conducted studies have 
analyzed the effects of institutional trust without explic-
itly taking into account well-documented alternative factors 
which may influence attitudes towards welfare expenditures. 
Among these alternative factors is the so-called self-interest 
hypothesis (Andreß & Heien, 2001; Svallfors, 1997). According 
to this hypothesis, the group of individuals who has been, or 
who is expected to be, the recipient of welfare programs tends 
to hold a more positive attitude to social welfare expenditures 
than are groups of individuals who are less likely to be recipi-
ents of social welfare. Testing the self-interest hypothesis on a 
sample of 14 transitional countries, Habibov (2012) found that 
wealthier individuals, as well as younger people with high 
levels of educational attainments, held negative attitudes to 
government expenditures on social welfare, while those who 
were less educated, women and older individuals held much 
more positive attitudes to social welfare. 
The ideology hypothesis could provide another important 
explanation of differences in attitudes to welfare expenditures 
(Jæger, 2008; Lipset, 1963). According to this hypothesis, atti-
tudes to welfare are determined by one’s view on the proper 
relationships between individuals and society (Derks, 2004; 
Jæger, 2006a, 2006b). People who support economic individu-
alism believe that each person should be responsible for his 
or her own welfare through active participation in the market 
economy, and as such do not support high levels of govern-
ment intervention. In contrast, people who support social 
equality expect basic rights for all citizens so that the full pop-
ulation can live according to prevailing standards, and they 
also defend welfare expenditures to a much greater degree 
than the previously mentioned group. Personal beliefs provide 
yet another important explanation (Osgood, 1960). Previous 
studies reported that a belief in the structural root of injustices 
in society is associated with increased support for welfare state 
expenditures (Blekesaune & Quandango, 2003; Voicu & Voicu, 
2011). 
Previous studies also suggest that public attitudes towards 
the redistribution of income and wealth are the result of a 
country’s economic and welfare conditions. Cutright (1965) 
has suggested that the creation of a welfare state is a govern-
ment response to the intensity of social problems. Wilensky 
(1975) has argued that governments extend or curtail social 
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welfare programs in response to social risks associated with 
levels of poverty and inequality. High levels of poverty and 
inequality can thus lead to demands for greater levels of re-
distribution and hence a more positive attitude toward redis-
tribution (Dallinger, 2010; Dion & Birchfield, 2010; Voicu & 
Voicu, 2011). In contrast, during times of economic prosperity 
associated with growth of gross domestic product, support for 
redistribution may fall, since the citizenship may feel less need 
for welfare state protection (Dion & Birchfield, 2010; Voicu & 
Voicu, 2011).
To overcome the above-discussed limitations, this study 
simultaneously explores the effects of institutional trust and 
self-interest, ideology, beliefs, and country-level economic 
conditions. In this way, we are able to estimate the impact of 
institutional trust vis-à-vis the above-described and well-doc-
umented explanations. 
Finally, previous studies have focused primarily on devel-
oped countries. In contrast, this study examines the situations 
in 24 former socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, 
the Caucasus and Central Asia. Having such a diverse sample 
of countries allows us to robustly test the effect of institutional 
trust on attitudes towards social welfare in transitional coun-
tries. In addition, this is one of the first studies to examine the 
under-researched regions of the Caucasus, Central Asia and the 
Balkans. The transitional processes in these regions have been 
associated with civil unrest, ethnic clashes, and full-scale wars, 
and were set against a background of profound economic re-
cession and political instability. The countries of these regions 
experienced longer periods of economic recession, which were 
more severe than those in high and middle income transitional 
countries (Habibov, 2011a, b). 
In the light of the above-mentioned evidence, the main ob-
jective of this study is to investigate the relationship between 
individual- and country-level institutional trust and public at-
titude to social welfare expenditures, while controlling for self-
interest, ideology, personal beliefs, and economic and welfare 
conditions in 24 transitional countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe, the Caucasus and the Central Asia.
Data and Method
Data Source
This study uses micro data from the Life-in-Transition 
(LIT) survey, which was conducted by the European Bank of 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) and the World Bank 
Table 1a. Descriptive Statistics for Outcome, Individual-level of 
Institutional Trust
Country Pro-social Welfare Individual-level Social Capital
1
 Expenditure (%)1 M SD Min. Max.
Albania 72.9 27.40 8.938 10 50
Armenia 91.4 26.23 8.953 10 50
Azerbaijan 88.9 33.39 9.252 10 50
Belarus 93.4 31.60 8.285 10 50
Bosnia 82.3 25.00 10.08 10 50
Bulgaria 93.3 23.95 8.598 10 50
Estonia 90.6 31.20 6.018 10 49
FRY Macedonia 74.5 23.79 9.607 10 50
Georgia 86.2 30.13 8.145 10 50
Hungary 86.5 27.69 7.809 10 50
Kazakhstan 89.3 31.06 7.639 10 50
Kyrgyzstan 88.9 28.78 8.947 10 50
Latvia 91.9 27.83 5.900 10 49
Lithuania 96.6 26.75 6.398 10 49
Moldova 87.5 26.66 9.023 10 50
Montenegro 80.8 29.07 9.036 10 50
Poland 93.1 27.46 7.444 10 50
Romania 93.9 27.06 8.137 10 50
Russia 93.8 25.44 8.125 10 50
Serbia 81.8 24.07 8.896 10 50
Tajikistan 86.6 37.48 8.562 10 50
Turkey 91.3 31.87 10.64 10 50
Ukraine 88.4 23.25 8.295 10 50
Uzbekistan 92.4 36.59 7.892 10 50
in 2006. Since the detailed description of the LIT’s meth-
odology, including a report on observations and a discus-
sion of the experiences with data collection is available else-
where (EBRD, 2007; Synovate, 2006), we will limit ourselves 
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Table 1b. Descriptive Statistics for Outcome, Country-level Variables
Country Pro-Social Welfare Country-level Variables
 Expenditure (%)1
Poverty Rate 
(%)2 Gini (%)
2,3 GDP4
Albania 72.9 24 31 6102
Armenia 91.4 50 32 4096
Azerbaijan 88.9 4 18 4496
Belarus 93.4 2 29 8541
Bosnia 82.3 4 29 6341
Bulgaria 93.3 4 33 9809
Estonia 90.6 5 33 16548
FRY Macedonia 74.5 4 37 8760
Georgia 86.2 52 39 3611
Hungary 86.5 1 24 16975
Kazakhstan 89.3 21 31 8699
Kyrgyzstan 88.9 70 28 1721
Latvia 91.9 3 35 13040
Lithuania 96.6 4 32 14197
Moldova 87.5 43 32 2362
Montenegro 80.8 6 29 8238
Poland 93.1 3 32 13784
Romania 93.9 12 28 9361
Russia 93.8 9 34 11853
Serbia 81.8 6 29 8517
Tajikistan 86.6 74 33 1500
Turkey 91.3 20 40 11465
Ukraine 88.4 1 26 5583
Uzbekistan 92.4 47 36 2001
Source: 1Synovate (2006, LITS) for share of population supporting pro-social welfare 
expenditure and measures of individual level of social capital; 2Alam et al. (2005) for 
poverty rate and Gini; 3Gini coefficient fluctuates between value of 0, that indicates 
perfect income equality in the country, and value of 1,that indicates perfect inequal-
ity. We converted Gini coefficient to Gini index in (%) to make it more comparable 
with other variables in the model; 4World Development Indicators (World Bank, 
2013) for GDP per capita in international USD adjusted for Purchasing power parity 
(PPP). 
Note: Figures are rounded up.
to a brief discussion of the data. The objective of the LIT was to 
gather directly comparable information about individuals’ and 
households’ experiences and attitudes in transitional coun-
tries. The LIT covered Central Europe (including the Balkans 
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and Turkey), Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and Central Asia 
(excluding Turkmenistan). The LIT is a cross-sectional survey, 
and its questionnaire incorporates a wide range of topics 
including: the socio-demographic characteristics of respon-
dents, household expenditures, and attitudes and values. In 
each participating country, 1,000 individuals were selected 
for face-to-face interviews with trained interviewers. Hence, 
our sample consisted of approximately 24,000 respondents 
in 24 countries. Because of its high levels of quality, the LIT 
has already been used for international comparative studies 
(Habibov, 2011a, 2012). 
Outcome Variable
The outcome variable of interest is a respondent’s atti-
tude towards prioritizing government expenditure in social 
welfare. This outcome variable is measured in the LIT by 
asking respondents the question “In your opinion, which of 
these fields should be the first priority for extra government 
investment?” A wide range of possible alternatives—from 
education and pensions to public infrastructure and price 
control—are provided for the respondent. For the purposes of 
our study, we recoded these responses to a new binary vari-
able. The new variable takes the value of 1 if a respondent 
identified one of the major domains of social welfare such as: 
old-age pension, unemployment insurance, social assistance 
benefits, education, and healthcare, as the first priority for 
extra government investments. This variable takes the value 
of 0 if a respondent identified responses which are not in the 
major domain of social welfare, such as building factories, 
army, agriculture, corruption, and the like, as the first prior-
ity for extra government investments. Consequently, this vari-
able is used to assess whether government social welfare is 
viewed by the population as the priority for extra government 
expenditures. The distribution of outcome variables by coun-
tries and across samples of countries under investigation is 
reported in the first column of Table 1. 
Independent Variables - Individual Level
Institutional trust. As suggested by the recent article by 
Voicu & Voicu (2011), we measure multiple dimensions of 
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institutional trust at the individual level by computing an 
additive index. For the all countries included in this study, 
the LITS provides information about the population’s trust in: 
(1) the government; (2) the Parliament; (3) courts; (4) political 
parties; (5) armed forces; (6) the police; (7) the financial system; 
(8) foreign investors; (9) non-governmental organizations; and 
(10) trade-unions. The response for each question is provided 
in a Likert-type scale and coded as Complete distrust =1, Some 
distrust = 2, Neither trust nor distrust = 3, Some trust = 4, Complete 
trust = 5. The additive index is computed by adding the scales 
for all ten dimensions. For instance, if a respondent answers 
‘complete mistrust’ in all ten institutions, then the respon-
dent’s index of trust is equal to 10. Conversely, if a respondent 
has complete trust in all ten institutions, then the respondent’s 
index of trust is equal to 50. The distribution of the index by 
countries and across the sample of countries under investiga-
tion is reported in the second, third, fourth, and fifth columns 
of Table 1. 
Self-interest. Age, gender, education, and household ex-
penditure level were selected, since the previous study by 
Habibov (2012) reported that these variables are strong predic-
tors of self-interest in transitional countries. For the purposes 
of consistency, we used a recoding system similar to that used 
in Habibov (2012). Hence, age was coded into two categories: 
17-39 years and 40-59 years, otherwise = 0. Gender was coded 
female  = 1, otherwise = 0. Education was coded into a binary 
variable based on the highest level of academic qualification 
attained: bachelor level or higher = 1, otherwise = 0. 
All households in each country of investigation were 
ranked into 5 quintiles based on the households’ total per 
capita expenditures. The first quintile represents the poorest 
25 percent of the country’s population, while the fifth quintile 
represents the wealthiest 25 percent of the country’s popula-
tion. The direct cross-country comparison of the households’ 
total per capita expenditures without using quintiles would 
not be valid, due to the high variation in expenditure between 
countries. For instance, expenditure of poorest households 
in Eastern Europe is equal to or higher than expenditure of 
middle strata households in Central Asia. By contrast, using 
quintiles allowed us to compare effects of the poorest 25 
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percent in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. 
Overall, according to the self-interest theory, we expect 
that being younger, having a higher level of educational attain-
ment, and living in a wealthier household will be associated 
with negative attitudes towards government expenditures to 
social welfare, while being a female will be associated with 
positive attitudes.
Ideology. To gauge the effect of ideology, as suggested by 
Habibov (2011a), two binomial variables, market economy and 
government involvement in reducing inequality, were created. 
A stated support of the market economy is expected to be as-
sociated with lower levels of support for welfare expenditures, 
while government involvement in reducing inequality is ex-
pected to have an opposite effect. 
Beliefs. To gauge the effects of belief, a binomial vari-
able, structural injustice, was created. This variable indicates 
whether an individual strongly believes that the main reason 
that people are currently in need is the result of societal in-
justice rather than bad luck or individual fault. We hypoth-
esize that belief in structural injustice could be associated with 
support for social welfare expenditures. 
The descriptive statistics for the above-described variables 
are presented in Table 2. 
Independent Variables–Country-Level
Institutional trust. Country-level institutional trust was 
assessed by aggregating individual institutional trust at the 
country-level (Blekesaune, 2007; Blekesaune & Quandango, 
2003; Habibov & Afandi, 2011; Poortinga, 2006a, b). The pro-
cedure for aggregating individual-level institutional trust to 
the country-level institutional trust detailed below. First of all, 
recall that institutional trust at individual level is represented 
by the additive index which varied from 10 to 50 for each indi-
vidual. Hence, about 1000 respondents in each country under 
investigation has an additive index with values from 10 to 50. 
Next, we computed the mean of individual-level institutional 
trust by country. Consequently, for each participating country, 
the mean of the additive index of institutional trust was com-
puted. Therefore, this mean represents the average level of 
trust for each of the participating countries. 
Economic conditions. We used Gross Domestic Product 
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(GDP), since it is the most widely used indicator of economic 
development employed by the studies on attitude to social 
welfare (Dion & Birchfield, 2010; Voicu & Voicu, 2011). GDP 
data referred to the same period of 2005 for all countries, 
which means a lag by one year, as compared with the LIT data 
collected in 2006. This permits us to reveal the impact (if any) 
of variation in country GDP to subsequent public attitudes 
towards social welfare expenditures. GDP measures for each 
country were taken from the World Development Indicators 
database maintained by the World Bank (2013) and reflected 
country GDP per capita in international U.S. dollars adjusted 
by Purchasing Power Parity. 
Table 2. Descriptive Statistics of Individual-level Independent 
Variables
Variable Definition M SD Min. Max. Yes (%)
No 
(%)
Age 17-39 Respondent age 17-39 = 1, otherwise = 0 0 1 39.4 60.6
Age 40-59 Respondent age 40-59 = 1, otherwise = 0 0 1 34.6 65.3
Female Respondent is female = 1, otherwise = 0 0 1 58.5 41.5
University 
Education
Bachelor education or 
higher = 1, otherwise 
= 0
0 1 19.3 80.7
Households 
Expenditure
Quintiles of total 
household expenditure 
per capita 
2.50 1.12 1 4
Market 
Preferable
Market economy pref-
erable = 1, otherwise 
= 0
0 1 42.5 57.4
State 
Involvement 
Strongly agree that the 
state should be actively 
involved in reducing 
inequality in society = 
1, otherwise = 0
0 1 69.5 30.4
Structural 
Injustice
The main reason for 
people in need today is 
injustice in society = 1, 
otherwise = 0
0 1 44.4 55.5
Source: Synovate (2006, LITS). Note: Figures are rounded up. 
Welfare conditions. Poverty and inequality are used to 
capture each country’s welfare conditions. Both measures 
are taken from the World Bank report (Alam et al., 2005). 
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The authors of the report used nationally-representative 
household surveys to estimate poverty and inequality levels in 
each of the participating countries. Poverty is measured by the 
international poverty line of 2.15 U.S. dollars per day, adjusted 
by Purchasing Poverty Parity, while inequality is measured by 
the Gini coefficient. The advantage of using the statistics from 
Alam et al. (2005) is that the poverty and inequality indices were 
created from nationally-representative data using the same 
methodology for each participating country, thus ensuring the 
validity and comparability of the statistics. Another advantage 
is that the indices referred to the same period of 2002-2003 for 
all countries. In addition, the poverty and inequality indices 
of 2002-2003 lag by 3-4 years as compared with the LIT data 
collected in 2006. This allows us to uncover the effect (if any) 
of variation in country-levels of poverty and inequality to sub-
sequent public attitudes towards social welfare expenditures. 
Finally, poverty and inequality reflect ultimate outcome and 
raison d’être of welfare state institutions, while indicators such 
as GDP per capita represent economic output only (Habibov, 
2011a). Even in the country with high GDP per capita, inequal-
ity in GDP distribution would lead to higher level of poverty, 
since a relatively smaller share of the resources are available 
to those at the bottom of the income distribution (Dagdeviren, 
Hoeven, & Weeks, 2004; Wodon & Yitzhaki, 2003).
Method 
We estimate a two-level binomial logistic regression model, 
modeling individual and country variations in a respondent’s 
attitude towards government expenditures in social welfare. 
These tests were conducted using the GLLAMM module to the 
STATA 10 software package (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2008). 
The selected multilevel modeling strategy accounted for the 
hierarchical structure of the LIT data set, which includes indi-
viduals (level 1) nested within countries (level 2). The selected 
multilevel model allows for the estimation of two important 
parameters: fixed and random effects. Fixed effect is defined 
as the overall relationships between individual-level indepen-
dent variables and outcome variable across all countries under 
investigation. The random effect, in the form of correlation 
coefficients rho, is defined as the variation between countries 
in respondents’ attitudes towards the priority of government 
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expenditures in social welfare, which cannot be accounted 
for by the individual-level independent variables. The illus-
trations of such an unobserved variation between countries 
could be cultural differences, such as customs and traditions, 
historical experience, for example, ethnic conflicts and politi-
cal instability, and different pace of transition, for instance, 
countries which were early reformers versus countries which 
were late reformers. A statistically significant rho signals that a 
considerable share of total variance in attitude originates from 
country-level differences. In addition, the higher the value of 
rho, the higher share of the total variance in attitude originates 
from community-level differences. Although the data set con-
tains only 24 clusters (countries), the recent studies concur that 
having more than 10 clusters is enough to estimate a multi-
level logistic regression (Austin 2010; Habibov, 2013; Snijders 
& Boskers, 1999).
Results
All together, a series of nine two-level logistic regression 
models was estimated sequentially (Snelgrove, Pikhart, & 
Stafford, 2009). The models report the likelihood of identifying 
expenditures for social welfare as a priority for government. 
Table 3 presents the results of the first four models (Models 1, 
2, 3 and 4). 
Model 1, the empty model with no predictors, provides 
a baseline estimate of the correlation coefficient rho. In this 
model, variation in the attitude is partitioned between indi-
viduals within countries and between countries. The purpose 
of this model is to estimate a benchmark for the size of coun-
try-level variation in all subsequent models. The value of the 
correlation coefficients rho in Model 1 indicates that 8.1% of 
total variance resides at the country-level. 
Country-level aggregated institutional trust is added in 
Model 2. This model estimates the unadjusted contribution of 
trust at the country-level to the attitude towards social welfare 
expenditure. The purpose of this model is to reveal how much 
variance, on the country-level, can be explained by trust. 
Model 2 provides no evidence of an association between insti-
tutional trust at the country-level and the attitude towards pri-
ority of government expenditures for social welfare. However, 
the model does show that 8.1% percent of total variance in the 
attitude still resides at the country-level. 
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Model 3 expands the second model by incorporating coun-
try-level poverty and inequality. Adjusting for country-level 
poverty and inequality levels did not substantially change the 
overall picture. All three country-level predictors are non-sig-
nificant, although the percent of total variance in the attitude 
residing at the country-level slightly was reduced to 7.7%. 
Adjustment for GDP in Model 4 demonstrated similar results. 
In addition, we separately regressed country-level indicators, 
namely poverty, inequality, and GDP on the attitude toward 
social welfare expenditure. In all cases, our country-level indi-
cators do not have statistically significant association with at-
titude towards social welfare expenditure. The results of these 
regressions are not shown here in order to conserve space, but 
are available from the authors upon request. 
The results of estimations for Models 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9 are 
reported in Table 4. In contrast with previous models, Model 
5 includes only individual-level trust variables to estimate the 
unadjusted contribution of respondents’ trust. Model 5 shows 
that an increase in social trust at the individual level is a signif-
icant predictor of attitudes towards social welfare expenditure. 
Model 6 expands the fifth model by including all the indi-
vidual-level variables of the model. This model is designed to 
estimate the simultaneous effect of all individual-level inde-
pendent variables without taking into account country-level 
variations. The results demonstrate that an increase in trust at 
the individual level continues to be associated with positive 
attitudes to social welfare expenditure, after adjusting for the 
simultaneous effect of all individual-level independent vari-
ables. In addition to trust, all other individual-level variables 
also have predicted directions. Being younger, having higher 
levels of educational attainment, living in wealthier house-
holds, and showing preferences for a market economy are as-
sociated with negative attitudes towards government expendi-
tures on social welfare. In contrast, being female and strongly 
supporting the state involvement in reducing inequality in 
society is associated with positive attitudes towards govern-
ment expenditures on social welfare. Finally, after controlling 
for the simultaneous effect of all individual-level independent 
variables, approximately 7.6% of total variance in the attitude 
originates in country-level differences, which is fairly similar 
to the results obtained in the previous models.
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Model 7 contains all of the independent variables on the in-
dividual- and country-levels, with the exception of trust at the 
individual level. This model allows us to begin answering the 
question of whether the contribution of country-level trust to 
the attitude towards social welfare expenditures is caused by 
compositional differences in the social-demographic 
Table 4a. Multilevel Regression for Public Support for Social Welfare Expenditure
 Model 5  Model 6  Model 7  
OR SE p-value OR SE p-value OR SE p-value
Fixed effect 
Individual (level 1) 
Age 17-39 0.565 0.035 0.000 0.570 0.035 0.000
Age 40-59 0.592 0.037 0.000 0.592 0.037 0.000
Female 1.481 0.061 0.000 1.475 0.061 0.000
University 
education 0.835 0.044 0.001 0.835 0.043 0.001
Households 
expenditure 0.960 0.019 0.037 0.959 0.019 0.031
Market 
preferable 0.856 0.036 0.000 0.864 0.036 0.001
State 
involvement 1.190 0.056 0.000 1.181 0.055 0.000
Structural 
injustice 0.994 0.044 0.894 0.974 0.042 0.574
Institutional 
trust of 
respondent
1.007 0.002 0.002 1.008 0.002 0.000
Country (level 2) 
Poverty 1.004 0.008 0.609
Inequality 0.999 0.024 0.964
GDP 1.001 0.001 0.141
Institutional 
trust 
aggregated
1.032 0.032 0.345
Random effect 
rho 0.079 0.076 0.067
p-value for 
rho 0.000 0.000 0.000
Log likelihood -8290 -8210 -8257
Source: Synovate (2006, LITS).
Note: Figures are rounded up. 
characteristics of individuals versus aggregated country social 
trust. As shown by Model 7, the country effects remain non-
significant after controlling for the individual- and country-
level differences, while the effects of social-demographic char-
acteristics of individuals is similar to those in sixth model. 
Table 4b. Multilevel Regression for Public Support for Social Welfare 
Expenditure
 Model 8  Model 9  
OR SE p-value OR SE p-value
Fixed effect 
Individual (level 1) 
Age 17-39 0.565 0.035 0.000
Age 40-59 0.591 0.036 0.000
Female 1.480 0.061 0.000
University 
education 0.835 0.043 0.001
Households 
expenditure 0.960 0.018 0.037
Market 
preferable 0.856 0.036 0.000
State 
involvement 1.190 0.055 0.000
Structural 
injustice 0.994 0.043 0.905
Institutional 
trust of 
respondent
1.007 0.002 0.001 1.008 0.002 0.001
Country (level 2) 
Poverty 1.004 0.009 0.618
Inequality 0.999 0.026 0.961
GDP 1.001 0.001 0.143
Institutional 
trust 
aggregated
1.009 0.029 0.759 1.023 0.033 0.473
Random effect 
rho 0.079 0.068
p-value for 
rho 0.000 0.000
Log likelihood -10020 -8208
Source: Synovate (2006, LITS).
Note: Figures are rounded up. 
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Model 8 only considers the contribution of trust variables, 
both at the individual level and at the country level. The aim of 
this model is to estimate and compare the effect of individual 
and aggregated country trust. Therefore, this model can further 
uncover the degree to which country-level differences in trust 
can be explained by individual-level trust versus country-level 
trust. By directly comparing the effects of the individual- and 
country-levels in Model 8, we can confirm that country-level 
differences in the attitude towards social welfare expenditure 
can better be explained by individual-level trust than by the 
country-level. 
Finally, Model 9 contains all of the independent variables 
on the individual and community levels. This model serves to 
estimate whether trust has a contextual effect after controlling 
for all socio-demographic and trust variables at the individual 
level. After controlling for all individual-level independent 
variables in Model 9, the effects of all country-level variables, 
including aggregated institutional trust, continue to be non-
significant. The effects of the individual-level independent 
variables, including institutional trust, remain about the same 
as in Models 6 and 7. At the same time, approximately 6.8% of 
total variance in the attitude was still found to originate from 
country-level differences.
Conclusion
The objective of the current study is to assess the impor-
tance of institutional trust on public attitudes towards gov-
ernment expenditure for social welfare in the former socialist 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the Caucasus, and 
Central Asia. Using comparable data from 24 countries, this 
study employed multilevel regression modeling, which allows 
for the simultaneous inclusion of variables at the individual 
and country levels of analysis. The empirical analysis present-
ed in this paper provides several interesting insights. 
First, with regard to the main aim of this study, the indi-
cator of institutional trust was considered a predictor at both 
the individual and country-levels simultaneously. The find-
ings suggest that the beneficial properties of institutional 
trust are attributable to the individual level only. Individual 
level institutional trust is associated, although rather weakly, 
with positive attitudes to social welfare expenditure in all es-
timated models. Individuals with higher levels of trust were 
more likely to support social welfare as a priority for govern-
ment expenditure. Therefore, the lack of institutional trust at 
the individual level has translated to into strong anti-welfare 
sentiment. In contrast, country-level institutional trust is not 
associated with positive attitudes to social welfare according 
to all the estimated models. There seems to be no evidence 
that a lack of institutional trust at the country-level leads to the 
erosion of support for social welfare expenditure. 
At the same time, between about 7 and 8 percent of total 
variance in attitude still resides at the country level. Taken 
together, these results seem to support the conclusion that 
institutional trust is not a key factor with regard to an un-
derstanding of differences in attitudes to social welfare ex-
penditure between transitional countries. Rather than having 
a contextual influence on attitude, the beneficial properties of 
institutional trust can only be found at the individual level. It 
must be highlighted that relatively low levels of cross-country 
variation in the attitude to welfare institutions in transitional 
countries is in line with previous findings. The recent study of 
Habibov (2013) focused on multilevel analysis of factors affect-
ing attitude to welfare state efforts to reduce inequality in 14 
transitional countries of the Baltic, Central Asia, the Caucasus, 
Moldova and the Slavic countries of the former Soviet Union. 
The study reported significant but relatively low variance in 
the attitude at the country level. Only 10(?) to 0.3 percent of 
total variance in attitude to social welfare efforts to reduce 
income inequality originated at the country level, depending 
on the variables and regression model specification. 
These findings imply that high levels of institutional trust 
within a country do not automatically lead to more positive 
attitudes towards redistribution. Even if a country has a large 
stock of institutional trust, not all citizens will benefit from it 
uniformly. Rather, the beneficial effects of institutional trust 
apply mainly to more trusting individuals. As such, the bene-
fits of institutional trust seem to be generated through an inter-
action between individuals and their social environment. This 
finding also supports the conceptualization of institutional 
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trust as a social resource. Like a natural resource, institutional 
trust may primarily benefit only those individuals who are 
able to access it. Individuals who are not able access it do not 
seem to profit directly from the available resources. 
This finding may also highlight a darker side of social 
capital. Putnam (2000) noted that tightly knit societies may 
be less tolerant towards certain groups of individuals based, 
for instance, on their ethnicity or religious beliefs. In this way, 
people belonging to these groups may be ignored or discrimi-
nated against by their fellow citizens. As a result, these indi-
viduals may experience much less support from government 
actions, including welfare expenditure. The recent study by 
Stern (2013) seems to support Putnam’s warning. The study 
found higher levels of social capital are associated with lower 
diversity, since high social capital helps to maintain racial 
homogeneity through the reduction in the costs of excluding 
minorities such as immigrants or non-dominant races. Higher 
trust and closer social networks assist community organizing 
aimed at promoting social exclusion based on racial, class, or 
immigration status criteria through various formal and infor-
mal mechanisms. 
The evidence of the negative effect of social capital can also 
be found beyond the U.S. and other industrialized countries 
in developing and transitional countries. Roßteutscher (2010) 
studied a sample of 70 countries covered by the World Values 
Survey worldwide. The author reported that in non-demo-
cratic countries, social capital serves to cement authoritarian 
rule inasmuch as the higher level of social capital is negatively 
associated with countries’ prospects for democratic develop-
ment. The negative effect of social trust, as a dimension of 
social capital, on democratic development is especially nega-
tive. Describing the mechanisms of negative effects of social 
trust on democratization, Roßteutscher (2010) stated that:
In nondemocratic contexts, … it [social trust] appears to 
throw a spanner in the works of democratization. Trust 
increases the stability of nondemocratic leaderships by 
generating popular support, by suppressing regime-
threatening forms of protest activity, and by nourishing 
undemocratic ideals concerning governance. (p. 752)
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The negative effect of social capital can be particularly 
strong in transitional countries (Kaminska, 2010). Considering 
the role of social capital in transitional countries, the author 
concludes that social capital hinders development of truly co-
operative behavior, facilitates the growth in shadow economy, 
and is a significant factor preventing adaption of the market 
economy.
Second, this study found various significant relationships 
at the individual level. Most of these relationships have a pre-
dicted direction. Being women, in the older age category, less 
educated, and low-income is associated with a more positive 
attitude to social welfare investments. This finding supports 
the self-interest theory of attitudes to welfare investments in 
transitional countries. We found that positive attitudes towards 
the state’s involvement in reducing inequality are associated 
with positive attitudes towards social welfare expenditure. 
It seems that people in transitional countries consider social 
welfare to be a primary instrument for reducing the existing 
gap between poor and rich. This finding shows that ideology 
is an important factor in explaining variation in public attitude 
towards social welfare. 
Third, while previous studies have reported significant 
effects regarding economic and welfare conditions (Blekesaune, 
2007; Dallinger, 2010), no effects on country-level variations 
with regard to poverty, inequality, and GDP were found in this 
study. This finding may suggest that, in transitional countries, 
the subjective assessments that people make of their own situ-
ations may play a more important role in shaping their atti-
tudes towards social welfare than country-level economic and 
welfare indicators. Indeed, consider the examples of Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, and Georgia, three neighboring transitional coun-
tries in the Caucasus. Oil-rich Azerbaijan has the lowest abso-
lute poverty rate – 4%, followed by Armenia – 50% and Georgia 
– 52%. Despite such a profound variation in country-wide eco-
nomic indicators, the differences found in peoples’ self-assess-
ments of their levels of welfare across the three countries was 
found to be negligible. About 14% of Azerbaijanis consider 
themselves very poor, which is close to 13% of Armenians and 
15% of Georgians (Habibov & Afandi, 2009). Likewise, about 
10% of Azerbaijanis consider themselves to be living in the 
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lowest strata of society, which is close to 12% of Georgians and 
17% of Armenians (Habibov, 2011b). It appears that low-in-
come individuals in Azerbaijan still consider themselves poor, 
even if they are relatively richer than Armenians or Georgians. 
This evidence may imply that individuals in transitional coun-
tries choose to support social welfare by comparing themselves 
with neighbors, friends, and co-workers, rather than making a 
cross-country comparison with regard to their relative levels 
of poverty and inequality. This conclusion is supported by the 
fact that all together, only about 7 - 8% of variation in attitudes 
to welfare can be explained at the country level. 
An alternative explanation for the lack of the effect of coun-
try-level poverty, inequality, and GDP is that countries differ in 
their social welfare policies, and specific programs. As such, 
the peoples’ perceptions about the fairness and effectiveness 
of these programs may also impact public attitudes towards 
social welfare expenditure (Habibov & Afandi, 2011; Svallfors, 
2007). Yet another possible explanation is that obtaining only 
single-year data on poverty and inequality is inadequate for 
revealing the true effects of country-level economic indicators. 
Unfortunately, many transitional countries, especially 
those in the Caucasus and Central Asia, are currently lacking 
reliable longitudinal data in general and data about poverty 
and inequality in particular (Habibov, 2012). Lack of longitudi-
nal data and cross-sectional design do not allow us to establish 
a cause-effect relationship between trust and attitudes to social 
welfare expenditures. This constitutes one of the limitations 
of this paper. Another limitation is that the data set used in 
the current study was not specifically designed for the purpose 
of examining institutional trust at the individual and country 
levels. The same items were used to measure individual- and 
country-level trust. Although it is common practice in the 
field of social capital research to aggregate individual mea-
sures to higher levels of analyses (Habibov & Afandi, 2011), 
we would be remiss if we automatically assumed that aggre-
gated measures fully reflect institutional trust at the country-
level. Using the additive index of institutional trust could also 
be considered a potential limitation, although it allows us to 
create a single aggregated measure of institutional trust at the 
country level. Future studies could overcome this limitation by 
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estimating and comparing the effect of trust to each institu-
tion on attitudes to social welfare expenditure. In spite of the 
above-mentioned limitations, this study provides valuable 
contributions with regard to institutional capital and attitudes 
towards social welfare expenditure in the transitional coun-
tries, and suggests an agenda for future studies on this topic. 
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